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Abstract
We show that any predicational theory of partial ground that
extends a standard theory of syntax and that proves some
commonly accepted principles for partial ground is inconsistent.
We suggest a way to obtain a consistent predicational theory of
ground.
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Fine defines ground as “the relation of one truth holding in virtue of
others” [7, p. 1].1 Given this definition, it is natural to think that we
should formulate axiomatic first-order theories of ground, which formal-
ize ground by means of a relational ground predicate of true sentences.
Call such theories predicational theories of ground. Predicational theories
of ground contrast with operational theories of ground, which formalize
ground by means of a sentential ground operator [3, p. 253–54, 5, p. 46–
47]. So far, most theories of ground in the literature are operational
theories of ground. But there are at least three theoretical reasons for
developing predicational theories of ground:
1. Quantification: Predicational theories of ground have greater ex-
pressive strength than operational theories of ground. In partic-
ular, using a ground predicate, we can formalize ground-theoretic
principles involving quantification over truths in a natural way.
Take, for example, the intuitively plausible claim that every truth
is either fundamental or grounded in some other truths. We can
straightforwardly formalize this claim using a ground predicate and
first-order quantification over truths, but using a ground operator
this is impossible. Without the use of non-classical devices, such
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as propositional quantification, it is impossible to formalize the
nested universal and existential quantification over truths in the
principle. Using a ground predicate, in contrast, we can formal-
ize the principle comfortably in the purview of classical first-order
logic.
2. Truth and Modality : Predicational theories of ground allow us to
study ground in the same context as truth and modality. It is gen-
erally accepted that truth should be treated as a predicate of sen-
tences, and it has recently been suggested to extend this approach
to modality as well [10, 13, 8]. There is an obvious connection be-
tween ground and truth, since ground is a relation among truths.
But there is also a close connection between ground and modality,
since ground is usually assumed to imply necessary consequence: if
a truth holds in virtue of some other truths, then the former truth
should be a necessary consequence of the latter truths [5, p. 38–39].
Both of these connections are most naturally studied using pred-
icational theories of ground: by combining predicational theories
of ground with predicational theories of truth and modality.
3. Models: Predicational theories of ground allow us to discover and
to study models of ground using classic model-theoretic methods.
It is currently an open problem to provide a semantics for the
impure logic of ground developed by Fine [5, p. 58–71]. This logic
is formulated using a ground operator, but once we translate it
into a predicational theory of ground and show its consistency, we
can rely on model-theoretic theorems to establish the existence of
first-order models. Once we know that such models exist, we can
study them using methods of model theory. This should provide us
with new insights into the semantics of the impure logic of ground.
But predicational theories of ground face a paradox of self-reference,
similar to the well-known paradoxes of self-reference that arise in predi-
cational theories of truth and modality. In this paper, I shall prove this
point for predicational theories of partial ground in particular. This is
the relation of one truth holding partially in virtue of another truth—
the relation of one truth “helping” to ground another truth [5, p. 50].
I show that any predicational theory of partial ground that extends a
standard theory of syntax and that proves some commonly accepted
principles for partial ground is inconsistent. Fine [6] and Kra¨mer [11]
present puzzles about the irreflexivity of partial ground: the principle
that no truth partly grounds itself. They show that certain intuitively
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plausible principles of logic and metaphysics lead to counterexamples to
the irreflexivity of ground. I add yet another puzzle of ground to the
mix. The new puzzle does not mention the irreflexivity of ground or
metaphysical principles unrelated to ground, thus it is genuinely differ-
ent from the previously known paradoxes.
To formulate a predicational theory of partial ground, we first need a
theory of syntax that allows us to talk about sentences.2 It is well-known
that we can develop such a theory in any sufficiently strong background
theory, like Robinson arithmetic for example. For the present purpose,
however, our concrete choice of background theory does not matter. All
that matters is that our background theory Θ satisfies the following three
minimal syntax conditions:3 The first condition is that Θ proves that
we have a unique name pϕq for every sentence ϕ in the sense that for all
sentences ϕ and ψ, Θ ` pϕq = pψq only if ϕ = ψ. The second condition
is that Θ proves that we have a function symbol ∨ that represents the
syntactic operation ∨ of disjunction in the sense that for all sentences ϕ
and ψ, Θ ` pϕq ∨ pψq = pϕ ∨ ψq. And the third condition is that Θ
proves the diagonal lemma. Informally, this lemma states that for every
condition on sentences there is a sentence that is provably equivalent
to the condition holding of itself. More precisely, if ϕ(x) is a formula
with exactly one free variable, then there exists a sentence δ such that
Θ ` δ ↔ ϕ(pδq). Note that any standard background theory of syntax,
such as Robinson arithmetic, satisfies all three of our minimal syntax
conditions.
Next, we need a way of representing partial ground. For this purpose,
we use the relational predicate x/y. For sentences ϕ and ψ, we informally
read the atomic formula pϕq/pψq as saying that the truth of ϕ partially
grounds the truth of ψ. For a negated atomic formula of the form ¬(pϕq/
pψq) we also write pϕq 6 pψq, which we correspondingly read as saying
that the truth of ϕ does not even partially ground the truth of ψ.
Philosophers have laid down various principles for partial ground [cf.
17, 5, 7], but it is already sufficient for a predicational theory of partial
ground to be inconsistent that it proves two widely accepted principles.
Let Θ now be a predicational theory of partial ground that satisfies
the minimal syntax conditions. The first of our two principles follows
directly from partial ground being a relation of true sentences: If the
truth of one sentence partially grounds the truth of another, then both
sentences should be true. This principle is known as the “factivity of
ground” and is generally accepted in the literature on ground [6, p. 100,
1, § 3].4 We get the condition on Θ that for all sentences ϕ and ψ:
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(FactL): Θ ` pϕq / pψq→ ϕ
(FactR): Θ ` pϕq / pψq→ ψ
The second principle concerns the interaction of partial ground and dis-
junction: Given that partial ground is the relation of one truth holding
partially in virtue of another, if a disjunction is true, then its truth should
be partially grounded in each of its true disjuncts. Also this principle
is generally accepted in the literature on ground [6, p. 101, 17, p. 117].
From this, we get the condition on Θ that for all sentences ϕ and ψ:
(∨1): Θ ` ϕ→ pϕq / pϕ ∨ ψq
(∨2): Θ ` ψ → pψq / pϕ ∨ ψq
The minimal syntax conditions and the conditions concerning partial
ground all may seem fairly uncontroversial when viewed individually. So
it may be somewhat surprising to learn that there can be no consistent
predicational theory of partial ground that satisfies all of them:
Theorem (Inconsistency Theorem). Any theory Θ that satisfies the
minimal syntax conditions, (FactL/R), and (∨1/2) is inconsistent.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be the formula x 6 x ∨ x. By the diagonal lemma,
there is a sentence δ such that Θ ` δ ↔ pδq 6 pδq ∨ pδq. Intuitively,
this is a sentence which “says of itself” that it does not partially ground
its own disjunction. By the second minimality condition, we have that
Θ ` pδq ∨ pδq = pδ ∨ δq. From this and Θ ` δ ↔ pδq 6 pδq ∨ pδq, we
get that Θ ` δ ↔ pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq by the substitutivity of identicals. This
splits up into the following two conditions:
(a) Θ ` δ → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq
(b) Θ ` pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq→ δ
We get finally the following argument:
1. Θ ` (pδq / pδ ∨ δq → δ) → ((δ → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq) → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq)
(Tautology†)
2. Θ ` pδq / pδ ∨ δq→ δ (FactL)
3. Θ ` (δ → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq) → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq (1, 2: MP)
4. Θ ` δ → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq (a)
5. Θ ` pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq (3, 4: MP)
6. Θ ` pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq→ δ (b)
7. Θ ` δ (5, 6: MP)
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8. Θ ` δ → pδq / pδ ∨ δq (∨1)
9. Θ ` pδq / pδ ∨ δq (7,8: MP)
10. Θ ` ⊥ (5,9: ⊥)
(†) : Note that every sentence of the form (ϕ→ ψ) → ((ψ → ¬ϕ) → ¬ϕ)
is a classical tautology and that theories prove all classical tautologies.
The inconsistency theorem is very similar to Tarski’s theorem about
predicational theories of truth [18] and Montague’s theorem about pred-
icational theories of modality [15] in that it is, essentially, a paradox of
self-reference. From a technical perspective, it should in fact not be sur-
prising that we get such a theorem after all: Combining self-reference via
the diagonal lemma with principles like (FactL/R) that allow us to push
a sentence outside the scope of a predicate and principles like (∨1/2) that
allow us to push a sentence into the scope of a predicate is recipe for
disaster.5 But from a philosophical perspective, there is a lesson to be
learned: We already know that we cannot understand ground simply in
terms of truth and modality [5], but ground behaves syntactically too
much like a combination of truth and modality to escape inconsistency
when paired with self-reference.
Three natural ways in which we could try to block the inconsis-
tency theorem suggest themselves: First, we could try to rule out self-
referential sentences of ground like the one used in the proof of the
inconsistency theorem. Second, we could try to restrict the principles
of partial ground used in the proof of the inconsistency theorem. And
third, we could try to formulate a non-standard logic of ground that
does not sanction the logical principles used in the proof of the incon-
sistency theorem. The analogy between the inconsistency theorem and
the theorems of Tarski and Montague suggests a terminology for these
approaches. Analogously to predicational theories of truth [9] and predi-
cational theories of modality [8], we get: typed theories of partial ground,
which avoid paradox by putting type-restrictions on the relation of par-
tial ground, effectively ruling out self-referential sentences like the one
in the proof; untyped theories of partial ground, which avoid paradox
by restricting the principles of partial ground; and finally non-classical
theories of partial ground, which avoid paradox (or: triviality) by aban-
doning classical logic in favor of alternative logics.
Untyped theories of partial ground are particularly appealing, be-
cause considerations of ground are already part of intuitively appealing
approach to untyped theories of truth. On an influential view about
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predicational theories of truth, self-referential sentences are ungrounded
and this is the reason some self-referential sentences lead to inconsistency
[12, 14]. This leads to the idea that we should restrict the principles of
truth to their grounded instances.6 Carrying this idea from theories of
truth over to predicational theories of ground, we arrive at the condi-
tion that the principles of partial ground apply if and only if the truths
involved are themselves grounded. There is a straightforward way of
formulating the desired restriction on the principles of partial ground
already in the language of partial ground. We can express that a sen-
tence ϕ is grounded by the formula ∃x(x / pϕq) and we can express that
a sentence ϕ is ungrounded by the formula ¬∃x(x / pϕq). The desired
restriction on (∨1/2) then amounts to saying that for all predicational
theories of ground Θ and for all sentences ϕ and ψ:
(∨∗1): Θ ` ∃x(x / pϕq) ↔ pϕq / pϕ ∨ ψq
(∨∗2): Θ ` ∃x(x / pψq) ↔ pψq / pϕ ∨ ψq
Every predicational theory of partial ground that satisfies the minimal
syntax conditions, (FactL/R), and the new conditions (∨∗1/2), proves that
the paradoxical sentence in the proof of the theorem is ungrounded:
Observation. Let Θ be a predicational theory of ground that satisfies
the minimal syntax conditions, (FactL/R), and (∨∗1/2). By the diagonal
lemma and the same reasoning as in the proof of the theorem, we get a
sentence δ such that:
Θ ` δ ↔ pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq.
But we can show that:
Θ ` ¬∃x(x / pδq).
Proof. By applying (∨∗1) to δ, we get that:
Θ ` ∃x(x / pδq) ↔ pδq / pδ ∨ δq
We only need the “left-to-right direction” of this biconditional for our
proof, which we can obtain via ↔-Elimination:
Θ ` ∃x(x / pδq) → pδq / pδ ∨ δq
Starting from there, we get the following argument:
1. Θ ` ∃x(x / pδq) → pδq / pδ ∨ δq
2. Θ ` pδq / pδ ∨ δq→ δ (FactL)
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3. Θ ` ∃x(x / pδq) → δ (1,2: MP)
4. Θ ` δ ↔ pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq (Diagonal Lemma)
5. Θ ` ∃x(x / pδq) → pδq 6 pδ ∨ δq (3, 4: ↔-Elim)
6. Θ ` ∃x(x / pδq) → ⊥ (1, 5: ⊥-Intro)
7. Θ ` ¬∃x(x / pδq) (6: ¬-Intro)
This result should make us optimistic about the prospects for a untyped
theory of partial ground. Moreover, we could add such a untyped theory
of partial ground “on top” of untyped predicational theories of truth and
modality. I conjecture that an interesting, consistent, untyped predica-
tional theory of ground can be developed in this way.
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Notes
1 For (opinionated) introductions to ground, see [4, 5]. For an overview of the
recent literature on ground, see [2, 19, 16].
2 A sentence is a formula without any free variables.
3 A theory is a set of formulas that is closed under derivability: a set of formulas
Θ is a theory iff (if and only if) for all formulas ϕ, if Θ ` ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Θ.
4 There are notions of ground in the literature that violate the factivity of ground
[cf. 5, p. 48–50]. According to such non-factive notions, ground is a relation on
sentences regardless of their truth value. Although non-factive notions of ground
make for an interesting theoretical possibility, in this paper we shall deal only
with the standard factive notion of ground, which satisfies the factivity of ground.
5 It should be clear at this point that not much depends on the concrete condition
(∨1/2)—the paradox is not a paradox of disjunction. All that matters is that
our predicational theory of partial ground proves a principle to the effect that
any true sentence partially grounds some other sentence. We could give the
following variant of the inconsistency theorem: If Θ satisfies (FactL/R) and either
Θ ` ϕ→ ∃x(pϕq / x) or Θ ` ϕ→ ∃x(x / pϕq), then Θ is inconsistent. I leave the
details of the proof to the interested reader.
6 The concept of ground used in the context of theories of truth is not exactly the
same as the concept of ground discussed in this paper. For example, the notion
of dependence defined by Leitgeb [14] is reflexive, whereas (partial) ground is
standardly taken to be irreflexive. The point here is that there is a striking
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analogy between the two concepts and that ideas that work for the one may very
well work for the other.
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